Vat- The core Vault, Dai, and collateral state is kept in the
Vatcontract has no external dependencies and maintains the central "Accounting Invariants" of Dai.
pokeis the only non-authenticated function in
spot. The function takes in a
ilkto be "poked".
Vatare written to be as generic as possible and as such have interfaces that can be quite verbose. Care should be taken that you have not mixed the order of parameters. Any module that is
authed against the
Vathas full root access, and can, therefore, steal all collateral in the system. This means that the addition of a new collateral type (and associated adapter) carries considerable risk.
Catis upgraded, there are multiple references to it that must be updated at the same time (
Vow.rely). It must also rely on the
End, the system's
pause.proxy(). Read more here.
spotterare relatively basic compared to most other portions of
dss. There is not much room for user error in the single unauthed method
poke. If an incorrect
bytes32is supplied the call will fail. Any module that is authed against the
spothas full root access, and can, therefore, add and remove which
ilkscan be "poked". While not completely breaking the system, this could cause considerable risk.
Vat- A bug in the
Vatcould be catastrophic and could lead to the loss (or locking) of all Dai and Collateral in the system. It could become impossible to modify Vault's or to transfer Dai. Auctions could cease to function. Shutdown could fail.
Spot- A bug in
spotwould most likely result in the prices for collaterals not being updated anymore. In this case, the system would need to authorize a new
spotwhich would then be able to update the prices. Overall this is not a catastrophic failure as this would only pause all price fluctuation for some period.
Vat- relies upon a set of trusted oracles to provide price data. Should these price feeds fail, it would become possible for unbacked Dai to be minted, or safe Vaults could be unfairly liquidated.
Spot- relies upon a set of trusted oracles to provide price data. Should these price feeds fail, it would become possible for unbacked Dai to be minted, or safe Vaults could be unfairly liquidated.
Vat- Governance can authorize new modules against the
Vat. This allows them to steal collateral (
slip) or mint unbacked Dai (
suck/addition of worthless collateral types). Should the crypto economic protections that make doing so prohibitively expensive fail, the system may be vulnerable and left open for bad actors to drain collateral.