Core Module
The State of the Maker Protocol
Module Name: Vault Core Module
Type/Category: Vault Core Module —> ( Vat.sol, Spot.sol )
1. Introduction (Summary)
The Core Module is crucial to the system as it contains the entire state of the Maker Protocol and controls the central mechanisms of the system while it is in the expected normal state of operation.
2. Module Details
Core Module Components Documentation
3. Key Mechanism and Concepts
Vat
- The core Vault, Dai, and collateral state is kept in theVat
. TheVat
contract has no external dependencies and maintains the central "Accounting Invariants" of Dai.Spot
-poke
is the only non-authenticated function inspot
. The function takes in abytes32
of theilk
to be "poked".poke
calls twoexternal
functions,peek
andfile
.
4. Gotchas (Potential sources of user error)
The methods in the
Vat
are written to be as generic as possible and as such have interfaces that can be quite verbose. Care should be taken that you have not mixed the order of parameters. Any module that isauth
ed against theVat
has full root access, and can, therefore, steal all collateral in the system. This means that the addition of a new collateral type (and associated adapter) carries considerable risk.When the
Cat
is upgraded, there are multiple references to it that must be updated at the same time (End
,Vat.rely
,Vow.rely
). It must also rely on theEnd
, the system'spause.proxy()
. Read more here.The methods in the
spotter
are relatively basic compared to most other portions ofdss
. There is not much room for user error in the single unauthed methodpoke
. If an incorrectbytes32
is supplied the call will fail. Any module that is authed against thespot
has full root access, and can, therefore, add and remove whichilks
can be "poked". While not completely breaking the system, this could cause considerable risk.
5. Failure Modes (Bounds on Operating Conditions & External Risk Factors)
Coding Errors
Vat
- A bug in theVat
could be catastrophic and could lead to the loss (or locking) of all Dai and Collateral in the system. It could become impossible to modify Vault's or to transfer Dai. Auctions could cease to function. Shutdown could fail.Spot
- A bug inspot
would most likely result in the prices for collaterals not being updated anymore. In this case, the system would need to authorize a newspot
which would then be able to update the prices. Overall this is not a catastrophic failure as this would only pause all price fluctuation for some period.
Feeds
Vat
- relies upon a set of trusted oracles to provide price data. Should these price feeds fail, it would become possible for unbacked Dai to be minted, or safe Vaults could be unfairly liquidated.Spot
- relies upon a set of trusted oracles to provide price data. Should these price feeds fail, it would become possible for unbacked Dai to be minted, or safe Vaults could be unfairly liquidated.
Governance
Vat
- Governance can authorize new modules against theVat
. This allows them to steal collateral (slip
) or mint unbacked Dai (suck
/addition of worthless collateral types). Should the crypto economic protections that make doing so prohibitively expensive fail, the system may be vulnerable and left open for bad actors to drain collateral.
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